This study is a detailed analysis of Speculation Game, a minimal agent-based model of financial markets, in which the round-trip trading and the dynamic wealth evolution with variable trading volumes are implemented. Instead of herding behavior, we find that the emergence of volatility clustering can be induced by the heterogeneous wealth distribution among traders. In particular, the spontaneous redistribution of market wealth through repetitions of roundtrip trades can widen the wealth disparity and establish the Pareto distribution of the capital size. In the meantime, large fluctuations in price return are brought on by the intermittent placements of the relatively big orders from rich traders. Empirical data are used to support the scenario derived from the model.
Introduction
The time series of financial asset returns are known to have a set of nontrivial quantitative and qualitative properties collectively called as the stylized facts [1] . One of the representative features is volatility clustering, a jargon related to the inclination of large fluctuations in price returns to form clusters, which results in a long time tail (often observed as either a power-law or a logarithmic function) in the decay of autocorrelation of volatility [2, 3, 4] . Moreover, those clusters burst intermittently over a wide spectrum of time scales [1, 2, 5] so that the temporal structure of price returns can be considered as fractals featuring with the absence of characteristic time scale [6] . As the volatility clustering can be observed in the different markets and instruments, it attracts the interest from many researchers, especially econophysicists, who are enthusiastic about discovering such a universality class and comprehending the mechanism behind.
Stochastic processes, which are standard models in the financial and econometric fields, have been used to describe the volatility clustering at the aggregated level. The representative models are the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) processes, both of which can reproduce the aperiodic bursts in returns 1 [2, 7] . Typically, these models are useful for practical analyses of empirical data, whereas they do not take account of endogenous factors at the microscopic level of financial markets.
On the other hand, bottom-up approaches, such as agent-based models, are favored in the econophysics field because the cause for the emergence of volatility clustering can be captured more easily with the explicit description of the interaction among traders. Several types of very simple agent-based models (so-called toy models) were constructed for the detailed analysis of financial markets. The representative ones can be listed as the percolation model [8, 9] , Ising (spin) model [10, 11, 12, 13] , Sznajd model [14] , the grand canonical Minority Game (GCMG) [15, 16, 17, 18] , and so on. The findings from the studies with these models revealed that the phenomenon volatility clustering may be originated in the synchronization of traders, namely the herding behavior [19] , which is the human tendency of following the actions of others 2 .
Meanwhile, there remains a possibility that some other mechanisms can also lead to the emergence of volatility clustering, considering that those toy models might overlook other fundamental microstructures of the market. Furthermore, although the inference of the contribution of herding behavior toward the irregular price bursts seems reasonable, it is hard to measure, even in a qualitative sense, the degree and the extent of herding in the real financial markets. Hence, it is natural and absolutely necessary to think about other potential mechanisms working for the emergence of volatility clustering. In fact, Maslov model [21] has revealed that the continuous double auction price formation system alone can induce the presence of fat-tailed distribution and volatility clustering in price fluctuations.
As a latent cause for the emergence of volatility clustering, we particularly pay attention to the combination of round-trip trading and dynamic wealth whose effects has not been clarified yet. While none of the introduced simple models concerns these details seriously, there are some prior toy models equipped with either one of the elements. For example, the concept of round-trip transactions has been installed in the $-game [22] to evaluate trading strategies, but they are not implemented in agents' trading actions 3 . Ferreira and Marsili [23] introduced a round-trip trade mechanism into Minority Game, Majority Game and $-game under the restriction of a successive two-step transaction. In the pattern game [24] , round-trip payoffs are incorporated by taking the reaction time of order placement into account. As for the dynamical wealth with variable trading volumes, there are extended GCMG models in which the wealth diver-2 GCMG, however, the reproduction of volatility clustering highly depends on the random initialization of the strategy tables [20] . The autocorrelation of volatility shown in [15] is indeed the failed case. Even when the volatility clustering turns up in this model, the tail length of its positive autocorrelation may vary quite a lot (ranging from shorter than 50-time lags to longer than 500-time lags).
sity and the varying investment sizes are considered [25] . Minority Game with dynamical capital (MGDC) [26, 27] allows the fractional investment of agents total capital. Note that dynamic capital is significant to bring on heavy tails of price return, but it can hardly reproduce the distinctive volatility clustering in MGDC without the inductive learning (see more details in Subsubsection 3.3.2).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that both the evolving money and the variable order size are implemented in the Patzelt-Pawelzik model [28] .
Based on these previous studies, we developed Speculation Game [29] , which is an adaptive agent model allowing both an explicit description of round-trip trading and a dynamic evolution of traders' wealth. In Speculation Game, round-trip trading is defined as a trading process in which an agent, responding In this paper, the detailed mechanisms for Speculation Game working on the emergence of the volatility clustering is analyzed through a series of simulation study. In particular, the built-up of heterogeneous distribution of traders' wealth through the round-trip trades, together with the realization of variable investment size, are revealed as another possible scenario for the emergence of financial stylized facts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the main ingredient of Speculation Game, while the one after the next presents the emerging mechanism of volatility clustering. Finally, the last section concludes the study.
Speculation Game

Model building
Speculation Game is a repeated game in which players compete with each other to increase wealth by capital gains through round-trip trades. The model was constructed by applying the structure of Minority Game [30, 31] including history, memory, and strategy table for decision making of the players. Moreover, two more distinctive parameters, namely board lot amount and cognitive threshold, are introduced to enable the players to place orders with variable trading volumes and to allow the history to carry both information of the direction and the magnitude of price change. Another unique point is that the game proceeds with alternations between realistic and cognitive worlds 5 , which represents the human tendency in handling complex information through simplification.
In Speculation Game, N players participate in a gamified market, with initial market wealth and S strategy tables. At discrete time t, player i uses her best strategy j * (∈ S) to take an action a j * i (t) from three options, that is buy (= 1), sell (= −1), or hold (idle) (= 0). When the player submits a buy or sell (short selling is allowed) order following strategy j * , the quantity of order q i (t) is decided with her market wealth w i (t) and the board lot amount B, the latter of which describes the ease in placing orders with multiple quantities,
where · · · stands for the flooring operator. Note that the closing quantity q i (t) is required to be the same as the opening one q i (t 0 ) in a round-trip trade. Also, the player's initial market wealth w i (0) is decided with a uniformly distributed random number U [0, 100) as below to enable her to order one unit at least:
If the wealth of a player decreases an amount to w i (t) < B as a result of roundtrip trade, the player will be forced to leave the market and substituted by a new player, whose market wealth is similarly decided according to Eq. 2.
Letting the initial asset price to be p(0) = 100, the market price change ∆p is the order imbalance equation proposed in [8] :
The quantized price movement h(t) is decided by the magnitude correlation between the price change ∆p and the cognitive threshold C, the latter of which is a threshold value used by the players to recognize a big price move:
Hence, the history H(t) is a quinary time series in the players' cognitive world recording the past price movements. To take an action according to the best strategy a j * i (t), the player with memory M at first take the reference of the last M digits of history H(t). Next, she looks up strategy j * to obtain a recommended action corresponding to the historical pattern. However, when the recommendation has no change from the opening order a j * i (t 0 ), the player will hold the opened position. With such trading rules, the market signal based position open/close is enabled for the player to accomplish a round-trip trade with a single position as well as the variable holding and idling periods. Note that the constraint for the completion of round-trip trades also impedes the spontaneous synchronized actions among the players (i.e., the herding behavior) 6 .
To determine the best strategy for the reference of next action, all the strategies are evaluated through virtual round-trip trades in the background similarly to the way applied to the strategy in use. Performances of the strategies are assessed in terms of the accumulated strategy gains G j i (t) (j ∈ S) calculated with the cognitive price P (t) corresponding to the quantized information. Letting
The gain of strategy j in a round-trip trade ∆G j i (t) can read as
and the accumulated strategy gain G j i (t) is measured by:
Whenever the accumulated gain of the strategy in use G j * i (t) is updated, all the accumulated strategy gains G j i (t) will be reviewed to renew strategy j * with the best performed one. If the renewed best strategy happens to be one of the unused strategies with which a virtual trade is ongoing, the virtual position will be closed immediately (i.e., the virtual round-trip trade is aborted forthwith) before the player switches to this new best strategy at the next time step.
Note that the evaluating system is developed by considering that the investing strategies should be evaluated with capital gains and losses by round-trip trades, as Katahira and Akiyama pointed out [32] .
Since the self-financing assumption is not made in Speculation Game, when a round-trip trade is closed, the player's market wealth w i (t) is updated with an investment adjustment ∆w i (t), which is the conversion of strategy gain into market gain by taking the trading volume q i (t) into consideration,
Here f can be an arbitrary function. In this study, ∆w i (t) = ∆G j * i (t)q i (t 0 ) is used for the simplicity.
Phase diagram
Under specific parameter settings, Speculation Game will get into the extreme state in which ∆p bursts irregularly with tremendous amplitudes 
Empirical evidence
Pareto's distribution of wealth even holds in the actual financial market as shown in Fig. 5 , which is the log-log plot of complementary cumulative distributions of total discretionary assets under management (AUM) of the world's 500 largest asset managers in 2017. The AUM data is taken from the report done by Willis Towers Watson [36] . The lower cut-off of this asymptotic powerlaw function (x min = 8, 914) is also found with the "poweRlaw" package [34] . The red line is a fitted power-law function with α = 1.54 (α = 0.689 when the vertical axis is the number of asset managers), whereas the green dashed line is a fitted exponential function. The goodness-of-fit test [35] gives p-value as 0.58, which is greater than 0.1, indicating that the power law is a plausible hypothesis for the data. Vuong's test [37] also concludes that the power-law distribution is the closer fitting as the likelihood ratio LR is 5.57 and the p-value is 2.58 × 10 −8 , which is less than 0. plies the existence of a certain number of cash-laden investors. Since ζ q is close to α shown in Fig. 5 , the power-law nature of trade size seems to be originated from that of AUM.
The role of round-trip trading
The horizon of round-trip trades
The reason why such wealthy players can emerge in Speculation Game is related to the trading horizon (or holding period) in the round-trip trades. Fig.   7 displays the averaged occurrences of strategy gain resulted from round-trip trades accomplished by all the participated players in the case of M = 5. Dot color denote those frequencies in the log scale. As shown in Fig. 7 , roundtrip trades with longer horizons can generate more diverse values of strategy gain, which means that a player tends to win or lose bigger as the horizon of a round-trip trade gets longer. The important point here is the fact that those big losers will either leave (more precisely, be withdrawn from) the market with a high probability or only have scarce wealth even if survived. Thus, the tail of wealth distribution in Fig. 4 is built by the wealth of those bigger winners in the round-trip trades. 
Empirical evidence
The diversified values of strategy gain with longer round-trip trades shown in Fig. 7 is in accordance with the empirical analysis done by Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) [42] . As shown in Fig. 9 , MFS reports that the greater return dispersion can be observed as the investment horizon extends, meaning that there are more opportunities for differentiated performance when one holds securities for longer time periods. 
Hold actions
The cause of longer trading horizon with smaller M lies with more hold actions taken by the players. In Speculation Game, there are two types of hold action. One type is the active hold, which is the action a player directly chooses as what her strategy recommends. The other type is the passive hold, which is the action a player switches to from a prohibited buy or sell action.
The prohibition of trade activates when the action recommended by the trading strategy happens to be the same as the one in the opening of position, in order to ensure the completion of a round-trip trade. Fig. 10 is the averaged accumulated stick bar graph denoting the statistics of actions among such two types of hold, buy, and sell for all the players along with different memory sizes. As Fig. 10 shows, both the ratios of active and passive holds increase as the memory size of players decreases, which correlates to the increment in horizon of a round-trip.
Precisely speaking, the ratio of passive hold grows a little larger, indicating the increase of passive hold has a greater effect on making the trading horizon longer.
It is worth mentioning that, even though the recommendations in strategy tables are generated in a pure random manner, ratios of the four kinds of actions are not balanced especially in the smaller M cases, which indicates the loss of the ergodicity in the system. If the system is ergodic, the summed ratio of passive hold, buy and sell should be double to the ratio of active hold , as the lager M cases shown in Fig. 10 . 
Other factors 3.3.1. Signal dependency
The non-uniformity in the ratio of trading actions is related to the fact that Speculation Game is a highly signal dependent game. If the genuine historical pattern were not employed, the game would not work properly. In contrast, an exogenous random history works well in Minority Game as long as it is common to all the participants of the game [43] . In Fig. 11(a) , a time series generated by Speculation Game while employing the exogenous histories is shown. It is obvious that the data does not contain any clustered temporal structures, which also supports findings from the Patzelt-Pawelzik model which states that, only the endogenously generated news (history), rather than the external one, can account for the large price fluctuations [28] . Another demonstration of the failure in the generation of volatility clustering is the case in which a round-trip trade was randomly opened with a probability p = 0.5 without referencing the price history as well as the current position. As panel (b) of Fig. 11 displays, similarly to the result in panel (a), there is no evidence for the intermittent burst of price fluctuations. From these demonstrations, one can conclude that the decision-making process of players for the round-trip trading, which results in the nonergodic actions, is indispensable to generate the volatility clusteringin Speculation Game. In fact, round-trip trading can also generate distinctive historical patterns of price returns in Speculation Game, which will be detailed in our future report. 
Inductive learing
Lastly, it should be remarked that the structure of round-trip trading could be a sole crucial factor for the emergence of volatility clustering. In Minority Game typed models, the inductive learning is needed for the elicitation of herding behavior among agents. If agents owned only one strategy, the function of inductive learning would not work in these models. As a typical example, in MGDC [27] (an extended Minority Game model equipped with dynamic capital and variable investments) with a single strategy table for each agent, the slow decay of autocorrelation in volatility measured by
where |r(t)| is volatility and τ is the time lag, will be absent due to the loss of adaptivity derived from the inductive learning. As panel (a) of Fig. 12 shown, the autocorrelation in volatility drops immediately to the noise level in MGDC with a single trading strategy (S = 1) for each player. To recover its reproducibility, MGDC agents typically need more than one trading strategy to grant their adaptability for the dynamical market circumstances [26] .
On the contrary, inductive learning is not indispensable for the recovery of long-range autocorrelation of volatility in Speculation Game. Even in the case when players behave mechanically, namely S = 1, the autocorrelation of volatility decays slowly similar to the cases of S ≥ 2, as the log-log plot in panel 
Conclusion
The analysis of Speculation Game with the simulations and the data from the actual financial markets illustrates that the emergence of volatility cluster- players and form a heterogeneous distribution, which can be regarded as another possible origin (other than the herding behavior) of the volatility clustering in the price return. This result is in accordance with the thinking elucidated in the previous study [44] , which states that fractal structures in stock price change are caused actually by that rich and poor traders make decisions essentially in the same way even though they place very different amounts of trading unit. The wealth inequality among players can be measured by the Gini coefficient, which is defined as follows,
where L(u) is the Lorenz curve [45] . can roil the market like the cases of higher strategy switching rate. Indeed, the time-averaged total market wealth decreases as C decreases, as the gradual change of dot colors in Fig. C.5 shows. 
